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Strategic Convergence Analysis:
The Strategyc40 within the framework of the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2025 (NSS)
1. Introduction: Scope and Methodological Approach
This paper examines the conceptual convergence between the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2025 (NSS) and StrategyC40, articulated by MovimientoC40 as a constitutional restoration project for Cuba. Although the two frameworks differ substantially in scale, institutional nature, and geopolitical reach, a comparative analysis reveals areas of philosophical and strategic compatibility, particularly regarding sovereignty, rejection of externally imposed political models, and preference for domestically grounded solutions.
This study does not argue institutional coordination, operational linkage, or policy delegation between the NSS and StrategyC40. Rather, it evaluates whether the principles and objectives of StrategyC40 are consistent with, and non-contradictory to, the strategic preferences articulated in the U.S. National Security Strategy for the Western Hemisphere.
2. Core Doctrinal Frameworks
2.1 U.S. National Security Strategy (2025): Sovereignty, Deterrence, and Strategic Realism
The NSS reaffirms the primacy of the nation-state as the foundational unit of international order. It emphasizes the protection of U.S. national interests through a framework often described as selective realism, rejecting universalist nation-building while maintaining readiness to deter threats through economic, diplomatic, and military strength.
The strategy explicitly criticizes post–Cold War approaches centered on ideological exportation and externally driven regime transformation. Instead, it prioritizes deterrence, resilience, regional stability, and respect for national sovereignty, while opposing transnational or external incursions that undermine the self-determination of states.
2.2 StrategyC40: Constitutional Restoration and National Sovereignty in Cuba
StrategyC40 is grounded in the assertion that the Cuban Constitution of 1940 remains the last legitimate expression of Cuban popular sovereignty. The strategy identifies a historical rupture of constitutional order—beginning with the 1952 coup d’état and followed by the failure to restore constitutional legality in 1959 —as the basis of Cuba’s political illegitimacy of current goberment.
Rather than proposing the construction of a new political system, the StrategyC40 advocates the restoration of an existing constitutional framework, presenting its approach as a legal, sovereign, and endogenous pathway. This emphasis on constitutional continuity and domestic legitimacy positions C40 as a sovereignty-centered movement rather than an externally modeled reform project.
3. Areas of Conceptual Convergence
3.1 Sovereignty as a Foundational Principle
Both the NSS and StrategyC40 elevate national sovereignty as a core organizing principle. The NSS explicitly affirms that states are entitled to prioritize their own interests and preserve their political independence. StrategyC40 similarly defines sovereignty as residing exclusively in the Cuban people, expressed through their historically ratified constitutional order.
In both frameworks, legitimacy flows from internal consent rather than external validation.
3.2 Strategic Realism and Rejection of Ideological Imposition
The NSS advances a realist posture that discourages imposing political systems that do not align with a nation’s history or traditions. StrategyC40 mirrors this principle by rejecting imported ideological models and advocating a solution derived entirely from Cuba’s own legal and historical foundations.
This parallel reflects a shared skepticism toward externally driven political engineering and supports the preference for domestic legal mechanisms as vehicles for political change.
3.3 Illegitimacy, Instability, and Internal Legal Resistance
The NSS identifies regional instability and illegitimate governance as risk factors when combined with broader geopolitical consequences, such as alignment with adversarial powers or disruption of regional order. StrategyC40 characterizes the Cuban regime as a prolonged usurpation of popular sovereignty under domestic constitutional criteria.
While the NSS does not adjudicate internal legitimacy per se, StrategyC40’s reliance on internal constitutional legality reduces the need for external political intervention, aligning with the NSS preference for outcomes generated through domestic processes.
4. Strategic Implications for the Western Hemisphere
4.1 Compatibility with Hemispheric Stability Objectives
The United States National Security Strategy declares its intention to “assert and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine,” seeking a stable, secure hemisphere free from adverse influences. The StrategyC40, by seeking the restoration of a constitutional republic in Cuba, presents itself as an ideal vehicle for achieving these objectives. The alignment can be seen on several critical points:
- Regional Stability: The United States National Security Strategy seeks “reasonably stable and well-governed governments.” The goal of the C40 Strategy is to replace what it defines as a dictatorship with a constitutional republic governed by the rule of law, directly fulfilling this requirement of stability and good governance.
- Immigration Control: One of the stated goals of the United States National Security Strategy is to “prevent and discourage mass migration,” asserting that “the era of mass migration must end.” A stable Cuba undergoing reconstruction under the 1940 Constitution would drastically reduce the migration flows that the U.S. National Security Strategy attributes to instability and lack of opportunities.
- Elimination of Hostile Foreign Incursion: The United States National Security Strategy seeks a hemisphere “free of hostile foreign incursions.” The restoration of a republic in Cuba, and the emergence of political and social change without sovereign will (socialism/communism) as proposed by the C40, would eliminate a regime aligned with U.S. adversaries, eradicating one of the oldest and most significant hostile foreign incursions in the region.
4.2 Rule of Law and Regional Predictability
StrategyC40’s emphasis on restoring a known constitutional framework suggests potential improvements in legal predictability, property rights, and institutional continuity. Such outcomes would be consistent with broader NSS concerns related to economic resilience, regional trade stability, and supply-chain security, should they arise through internal Cuban processes.
5. Conclusion: Strategic Compatibility without Instrumentalization
This analysis demonstrates that StrategyC40 is philosophically compatible with several core principles articulated in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, particularly sovereignty, rejection of ideological imposition, and preference for domestically generated solutions.
Crucially, this compatibility should not be interpreted as operational alignment, policy delegation, or strategic instrumentalization. Rather, it illustrates how a sovereign, legal, and internally grounded movement may coexist with U.S. strategic preferences without violating non-interventionist constraints embedded in contemporary U.S. doctrine.
Note: The StrategyC40 is public and available at: movimientoc40.com/estrategiac40, where it can be read directly on the website or downloaded in PDF, audio, and video formats.
